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SEIZURE OF PRIVATE PAPERS PURSUANT TO A
SEARCH WARRANT: WITH SPECIFIC APPLICA-
TION TO FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA
BOOKMAKING PROSECUTIONS
I. INTRoDUcION
Bookmaking is big business in the United States.' As an integral
part of such a business, the bookmaker maintains and uses numerous
records, statistics and memoranda, e.g., lists of horses running in
various races at various tracks, books and tables to compute the odds
on horses, and scraps of paper on which to record the bets when they
are received by him.
When a law enforcement agency obtains knowledge of a book-
making operation they may attempt to ascertain from their own per-
sonal knowledge whether a crime is being committed in the estab-
lishment and make an arrest. Or they may submit information to a
judge based on their own personal observations or hearsay informa-
tion or both, and request a search warrant.
A search warrant is theoretically the preferred method to search
an enclosure. The courts continually state, but less often hold, that
less evidence is necessary to support a finding of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant than would be necessary to uphold
an officer's search made pursuant to an arrest.' The calm, detached
determination of a judge is preferred to that of a police officer en-
gaged in the "competitive" task of ferreting out criminals.
1 "The nationwide crime syndicate ... became 'big business' during the prohibition
era. When the 'noble experiment! ended, the gangs had to look for a new and
equally lucrative racket. . . . Searching for a new field that would rival boot-
legging as a money maker, the mobs turned to illegal gambling, which now,
according to the experts, has become a $15,000,000,000 to $25,000,000,000 an-
nual racket in the United States. A huge slice of this is being extracted by organ-
ized criminal syndicates.
"Slot machines, punchboards, cards, dice, roulette, wagers on sporting events,
and the 'numbers' racket were exploited to the hilt. But the big killing came when
the mobs successfully penetrated and organized the field of illegal bookmaking
on horse races." KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA 35 (1951).
2 Asuilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 109 (1964).
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A warrant to be valid must (1) be issued by an authorized person,
a judge or commissioner invested with power by statute,' (2) be
supported by sworn affidavits showing reasonable cause to believe a
crime is being committed or contraband is being kept,' (3) describe
with sufficient particularity the persons, places and things to be
searched or seized5 and (4) be served in a constitutionally recog-
nized manner.'
Assuming the warrant meets these four requirements the problem
discussed by this note is whether such papers, records and notes can
be constitutionally seized in California in the light of the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions making the federal exclu-
sionary rule& (holding evidence obtained by means of an illegal
8 "Under the common law, justices of the peace had the general power to issue
search warrants for stolen goods, and currently the justice courts, being of limited
jurisdiction, have been vested with the power of issuing such writs through thq
authority of the various state constitutions and legislative enactments. The respec-
tive state statutes define and limit the authority of the justice of the peace and
the jurisdiction of that court to issue warrants is confined to the exact powers
allocated by statute.
"At the present time, the authority of officers to issue search warrants is gener-
ally regulated by statutes, the limits of such authority being strictly confined to
the power granted by the statute, although the ultimate power, with its express
limitations, is found in the constitutional guaranty.
"Federal statutes regulate the authority of judicial officers to issue such warrants,
and designate the judge of the United States District Court, or territorial court
of records, or a United States Commissioner for the district that has jurisdiction
of the person or property to be searched, and such statute regulating the issuance
of search warrants, is declaratory of the common law insofar as the procedural
sections of the act are concerned." 1 VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES Af D IMMUNI-
TIES 303-04 (1961).
4 U. S. CONST. AMEND. IV; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308 (1921).
s Ibid.
6 The early common law firmly established the right of the individual to be pro-
tected from unannounced police entries. As stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1962), "The protections of
individual freedom carried into the Fourth Amendment undoubtedly included this
firmly established requirement of an announcement by police officers of purpose
and authority before breaking into an individual's home. The requirement is no
mere procedural nicety or formality attendant upon the service of a warrant. Deci-
sions in both the federal and state courts have recognized, as did the English
courts, that the requirement is of the essence of the substantive protections which
safeguard individual liberty ......
The early common law rule has been modified in several states and by the fed.
eral government. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 844, 1531; 18 U.S.C. § 3109. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional foundation of these re-
quirements in Peopel v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956) and
People v. Hammond, 54 Cal.2d 846, 853, 357 P.2d 289, 294 (1960). Also see,
1 VARON, op.. cit. supra, note 3, at 398-99, for cases denying forcible entry to
executing officers.
7 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Supreme Court of the United States in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), held that evidence obtained by
means of an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible in a federal court. This
rule was held not to apply to the states through the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), even though
the right of privacy was "fundamental in our concept of ordered liberty" and did
apply to the states. The court thus held the exclusionary rule to be a rule of evi.
dence and not a mandate of the Constitution. The rule was elevated to a mandate
by Mapp.
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search and seizure inadmissible in court) and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states.'
The problem is significant because normally this type of evidence
forms the major basis of the bookmaking conviction; it is used as
circumstantial evidence of the crime. If bookmaking papers cannot
constitutionally be seized, any such evidence would be suppressed
under the exclusionary rule as extended to the states by Mapp v.
Ohio.,
II. PROPERTY VALIDLY SEIZABLE UNDER A SEARCH WARRANT
A. At Common Law
At early common law the search warrant was unknown. Any un-
consented entrance into the land of another was a trespass."
The first use of the search warrant was confined to cases where
the owner of chattels was willing to swear that property stolen from
him was lodged on the land of another. For a false swearing, a suit
for trespass was sure to follow."
The use of a search warrant was gradually expanded to cover not
only the situation where the property was stolen but where a person
had in his possession property which was illegal to possess. Illegal
possession included two types of cases, (1) where the goods were
subject to a proper tax which was due and unpaid and (2) where
the property possessed was the means or instrumentality of commit-
ting a crime.'2
In the middle of the 18th century an attempt was made to broaden
the use of the search warrant to the extent that it would authorize
searches of private homes and papers for defamatory material usable
as evidence to convict for criminal and seditious libel. Lord Cam-
den's famous denunciation of such a proceeding was severe and
Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers" stands
today as a landmark of English liberty. It was argued that the proce-
dure could be authorized because it resembled the procedure for
seizing stolen property pursuant to a search warrant. His Lordship
retorted:
I answer that the difference is apparent. In the one, I am permitted
to seize my own goods, which are placed in the hands of a public
8 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9 367 U.S. at 643.
10 CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 234 (1962); Kaplan, Search and
Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law', 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474 (1961).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
"3 19 How St. 1029 (1765), an abbreviated version appears in 2 Wils. K. B. 275,
195 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
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officer till the felon's conviction shall entitle me to restitution. In
the other, the party's own property is seized before and without con-
viction, and he has not power to reclaim his goods, even after his
innocence is declared by acquittal.
The case of searching for stolen goods crept into the law by imper-
ceptible practice. No less a person than my Lord Coke denied its
legality, (Inst. 176;) and therefore, if the two cases resembled
each other more than they do, we have no right, without an act of
parliament, to adopt a new practice in the criminal law, which was
never allowed from all antiquity.
Lastly it is argued as an argument of utility that such a search is a
means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence .... There is
no process against papers in civil causes. It has been often tried but
never prevailed. . . . In the criminal law such a proceeding was
never heard of; and yet there are some crimes, such, for instance,
as murder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking, to say nothing of
forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious than libeling. But our
law has provided no paper-search in these cases to help forward
the conviction.
Entick is a product of the notion that a man's home was his castle,
to be violated only under the most exigent circumstances."
B. Under the Federal Constitution
At the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution,
and notably the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the use and nature
of the search warrant was firmly embodied in the common law with
the limitations provided in Entick. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, provides:
No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. ...
The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that search war-
rants were in familiar use when the Constitution was adopted, and
that the framers of the Constitution were well aware of the limita-
tions on such use. The scope of the protection of the right of privacy
was thus well defined in the area of the search warrant.
24 The eloquent passage in Chatham's speech on general warrants is familiar: "The
poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his forces
dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." COOLEY CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 365, N. 4 (5th ed. 1883).
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The Supreme Court of the United States in Boyd v. United States,
when speaking of Entick, stated: 5
As every American statesman, during our revolutionary and forma-
tive period as a nation was undoubtedly familiar with this monu-
ment of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ulti-
mate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted
that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the
fourth amendment to the constitution and were considered as suffi-
ciently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and
seizures. 16
Boyd was the landmark case of the 19th century relative to the
scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 6 The suit was brought
by the federal government to forfeit smuggled goods. During the
course of the trial the quantity and value of the goods came into
issue. Pursuant to a statute the defendant was ordered by a sub-
poena duces tecum to turn over invoices of the goods in question.
The issue was whether this procedure and the statute authorizing
such were constitutional. The court held it to be a violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments and reversed.
The court in one passage stated:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two
amendments. [Fourth and Fifth] They throw great light on each
other. For the 'unreasonable searches and seizure' condemned in
the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in crimi-
nal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling
a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which
is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the ques-
tion as to what is an unreasonable search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to
perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is substantially different from com-
pelling him to be a witness against himself.'17
Although seizure of stolen goods was a procedure authorized by
common law, the court held that a compulsory production of a
man's private papers to establish a quasi-criminal charge against him
was an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, just
as much as actual entry and physical search and seizure on his prem-
ises, if the sole purpose was to discover evidence againt him. In
15 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1885).
16 Boyd was relied on extensively in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
for the adoption of the exclusionary rule in the federal courts pertaining to il-
legally seized evidence.
17 116 U.S. at 633.
19651
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEWV
either case the result is the same, compelling the defendant to be a
witness against himself."8
The Court went on to point out categories other than smuggled
goods, where property was properly seizable:
So, also, the supervision authorized to be exercised by officers
of the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable ar-
tides, and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept
for their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of
unreasonable searches and seizures. So, also, the law which provides
for the search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlaw-
ful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue
or disposition, such as counterfeit coins, lottery tickets, imple-
ments of gambling, etc., are not within this category.19
The principles laid down in the Boyd case have had a checkered
history in the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1921, that
Court held in Gouled v. United States that the government could
not seize, via a search warrant, papers of a purely evidentiary char-
acter, for a valid search and seizure can be
resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure
may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant
may have in the property to be seized, or in the rights to possession
of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders posses-
sion of the property by the accused unlawful and provides it may
be taken.2'
The Court apparently retreated from this position in the case of
Marron v. United States,"2 where the police were allowed to seize a
ledger containing the names of customers of an illicit liquor busi-
ness under the authority of a valid arrest and a search made incident
thereto. The officers had a right to arrest and as an incident thereto,
without a warrant, contemporaneously search in order to find and
seize things used to carry on a criminal enterprise. The court rea-
soned,
if the ledger was not essential to the maintenance of the establish-
ment as were bottles, liquors and glasses it was none the less a part
of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense.23
The Court, in 1932, returned to a position closer to the principles
enunciated by Boyd in United States v. Lefkowitz. 24 There a war-
's Boyd goes on to point out that it was not by accident that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments were found next to each other. They were penned largely to prevent
the practice of the notorious writs of assistance which had large use in England.
Id. at 630.
129 Id. at 623.
20 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
21 Id. at 309.
22 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
23 Id. at 199.
24 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
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rant for the arrest of the defendant was issued. There was no search
warrant. The arrest was made at the office of the defendant and a
search was made incident thereto. The officers seized papers and
books and stationery and business cards, used to record the cus-
tomers to whom the illicit liquor was being sold. They were used in
evidence and the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to use a
room to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the Prohibition Act.
The Court assumed a valid arrest and stated, in dictum, that the
right to search there, under the circumstances, could not lawfully
have been done under a warrant specifically describing the property.
The Court distinguished the Marron case as being one where the
crime was committed in the presence of the officers and the ledger
seized was contiguous to the transaction. The Court went on to point
out that the search of Lefkowitz's office was exploratory, and though
the papers were intended to be used to solicit orders they were un-
offending in themselves.
In 1946, five justices relied on the Marron case in Harris v. United
States" to support the seizure of altered draft cards incident to a
lawful arrest. The main question involved was the legality of the
search; that is, could a five-hour search be made incident to a law-
ful arrest, and not whether the draft cards could be seized once
found. They were obviously the means of committing the crime.
Four dissenting justices severely criticized the Marron case and con-
tended that Lefkowitz had limited Marron to its own peculiar facts,
i.e., the crime of maintaining a nuisance in the presence of officers,
with papers contiguous to the crime and in clear view.
The rule laid down by these cases is an outgrowth of the common
law and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It holds that books,
records, papers, letters and other evidence of a private lawful nature
cannot be an object of seizure under a search warrant. The person
from whose possession these articles were taken would be compelled
to testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution which protects an individual from
being compelled to give testimony against himself in a criminal case.
The general rule is that private papers may not be seized. The dis-
tinction is drawn between mere evidence and objects that may be
seized. The exceptions to the general rule are that where papers,
books and records are the means by which a crime is committed, or
are required by law to be kept, or are illegal to possess, they are
V; 331 U.S. 145 (1946).
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susceptible of being seized.26 This general rule with its exceptions is
called by the courts the "mere evidence" rule.
Judge Learned Hand posed the problem by stating:
that a pa per may be itself the very thing against which the law
is directed... As was stated in Gouled v. United States, papers
as such have no sanctity, and may be seized like any other property,
if they offend. Courts have at times extended the doctrine to papers
not actually part of the criminal act, but necessary to the conduct of
the venture as a whole. . . Yet, if all records of the offender's
doings, such as account books or customer's lists, are to be in-
cluded, there would seem to be no escape from allowing a search
at large through all his papers. It is seldom that one finds a docu-
ment containing evidence of crime which was not at one time used
in its commission; the papers important in any prosecution are or-
dinarily either communications passing between the actors or rec-
ords necessary to keep track of the details. These are all that the
prosecution requires, and all that, except in rare instances, it will
ever get. They cannot be reached, except through a search of all the
offender has, to allow which would be to contain exactly what the
amendment [Fourth] was designed to prevent.2 7 (Emphasis added)
A curious thing has happened in the lower federal courts. With
both Lefkowitz (disallowing the seizure of records of illegal liquor
sales) and Maron (allowing the seizure of such records) in force,
neither being overruled, the courts can choose either one of the
26 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16
F.2d 202, (2d Cir. 1926); 1 VARON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 405.
"The federal courts have given the Fifth Amendment a construction under
which the use in evidence against a person of property obtained by the federal
government in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment constitutes a
violation of his rights under the Fifth. The rule has been severely criticized as an
unnecessary protection of an accused and as increasing the difficulties of law en-
forcement, but has been defended with equal vigor as tending to reduce violations
of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures by giving the injured party
the most effective remedy." ROTTSCHAFFER, CONSIITUTIONAL LAW 748 (1939).
A leading case in this area is Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118 (9th
Cir. 1944), which involved a prosecution for conspiracy and for violation of an
executive order prohibiting shipment of material to Japan. F. B. 1. agents seized
papers from the brief case of the defendant which could be used to show infer-
entially the conspiracy. There was no contractural agreement among the papers to
break the law. The court held that the seizure violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
One late case in this field is United States v. Stern, 225 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), which involved a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the government by
falsifying and concealing the material fact that the federal income tax of a client
of the defendant was uncollectible. The defendant was a certfied public account-
ant. Pursuant to a search warrant a number of papers were seized ranging from
hand written scroll computation sheets to executed photostated forms which were
used to inform the government of the inability of the defendant to pay the tax
due. The court held that all papers seized except the photostated forms must be
returned. It was stated that the test was whether the papers played a significant
role in the commission of the crime and that only the photostated forms met this
test.
27 16 F.2d at 203.
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cases to reach a desired result. If the particular court desires to hold
the search and seizure of the papers valid it cites the Marion case
and the language relative to the proposition that papers have no
special sanctity, etc. 8 If it desires to hold the seizure illegal it cites
the Lefkowitz case."9 Seemingly, once the a priori decision is reached,
either Marron or Lefkowitz is cited and the other is ignored. While
this gives freedom to the lower courts it does little for uniformity.
The Supreme Court of the United States should resolve the issue.
Considering the present make-up of the Court, Mai-on would
probably be the case to fall. This conclusion is strengthened by the
language in Malloy v. Hogan holding the privilege against self-
incrimination applies to the states:
This conclusion [the holding] is fortified by our recent decision in
Mapp v. Ohio . . . overruling Wolf v. Colorado . . . which had
held 'that in prosecutions in a state court for a state crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid of admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.' . . . Mapp held
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination im-
plemented the Fourth Amendment in such cases, and that the two
guarantees of personal security conjoined in the Fourteenth
Amendment to make the exclusionary rule obligatory upon the
States. We relied upon the great case of Boyd v. United States.
In thus returning to the Boyd view that the privilege is one of
the 'principles of a free government.' . . . (Emphasis added)30
Lefkowitz grew directly out of Boyd and as can be seen, Boyd is
looked upon with favor by the present Court.
C. Under California Law
Cal. Pen. Code § 1524 states the grounds for which a search war-
rant may be issued:
1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
2. When the property or things were used as the means of com-
mitting a felony.
3. When the property or things are in the possession of any per-
son with the intent to use it as a means of committing a public
offense, or in the possession of another to whom he may have
28 Robinson v. United States, 327 F.2d 618, 622 (8th Cir. 1964); Smith v. United
States, 321 F.2d 427, 430 (9th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617
(7th Cir. 1960); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959); Wil-
liams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 795 (9th Cir. 1959); Matthews v. Correa,
135 F. 2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir. 1936); Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1, (5th Cir. 1933); cert. denied 289
U.S. 762 (1933); United States v. Lord, 184 F. Supp. 923, 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
29 Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v.
Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765, 767 (N.D. Cal. 1951); United States v. Stern, 225 F.
Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) is the best recent analysis of the problem.
30 378 U.S. at 5.
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delivered it for the purpose of concealing it or preventing its
being discovered.
4. When the property or things to be seized consist of any item or
constitutes any evidence which tends to show a felony has been
committed, or tends to show that a particular person has com-
mitted a felony. (Emphasis added) 8'
The first three subdivisions of the section generally follow the
common law. The fourth subdivision would appear to allow the
seizure of "mere evidence."
Subdivision four of the statute was passed after the Supreme
Court of California decided the case of People v. Cahans2 which
adopted the exclusionary rule used by the federal courts and later
applied to the States by Mapp. The reason was, evidently, that the
California legislature did not want to adopt the "mere evidence"
rule used in the federal courts."
The courts continue to implement this authorization in the face
of Mapp, allowing the seizure of such items as a rent receipt on the
room in which narcotics were stored, and a parking ticket linking
the defendant to a getaway car used in a robbery.3" California courts
have never, however, justified such a seizure under Pen. Code §
1524 (4)."
California does continue to use an abbreviated version of the
"mere evidence" rule to bar seizure of evidence relating to crimes
other than that occasioning the search. This distinction is pointed up
by Yonclair v. Superior Court,37 a pre-Mapp decision holding that
the defendant doctor's medical records relating to the abortion for
which he was arrested were subject to seizure, but that records re-
lating to other abortions were immune from seizure.
31 Enacted 1872, as amended Stats. 1957, c. 1884, p. 3289, § 1.
32 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
33 California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 STAN. L.R. 318 (1964).
34 People v. Van Eyk, 56 Cal. 2d 471, 364 P.2d 325, 15 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 824 (1962).
35 People v. Lyons, 204 Cal. App. 2d 364, 22 Cal. Reptr. 327 (1961).
so People v. Lyons, supra note 35, disallowed the objection that the parking ticket
was "mere evidence" on the grounds that the objection was not raised at the trial
level and therefore could not be raised on appeal. People v. Van Eyk, 56 Cal. 2d
471, 364 P.2d 325; 15 Cal. Rptr. 150, denied the objection that the seizure of
the rent receipt was "mere evidence" on the basis that it was the means of corn-
mitting the crime. Oddly enough, in support of this conclusion he court cites
Alarron v. United States. It is submitted that the conclusion of Van Eyk is pat.
ently absurd. If a rent receipt is not "mere evidence"-nothing is.
37 193 Cal. App. 2d 135, 14 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1961); Also see People v. Mills, 148
Cal. App. 2d 392, 401, 306 P.2d 1005 (1957), involving a prosecution for viola-
tion of the Corporate Securities Act wherein papers and other evidence relating
to the specific violation and other non-known or suspected violations were seized.
The court stated: "Though some of the authorities would limit the search to
instrumentalities of the crime (citations omitted), the right is rnot so narrowly
confined in this jurisdiction. It may be exercised on the particular crime for which
the arrest is made."
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Since California has not adopted the "mere evidence" rule of the
federal courts the question becomes: Can California constitutionally
refuse? It is submitted that they cannot.
The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to the
states. 8 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and the
test under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment is
the same.39 Prior to Mapp v. Ohio40 and Malloy v. Hogan41 the
federal rule relative to the seizure of "mere evidence" was followed
by a minority of the states. The majority of the states allowed the
seizure of "mere evidence" pursuant to an otherwise valid search
warrant.42 It is submitted that the states no longer have any say in
the matter. When Boyd held that the papers in question could not
be seized it did not do so as a matter of policy. The holding was
more than supervisory authority over the federal courts; it was a
mandate of the Federal Constitution. This being the case, it would
appear that the federal rule is now the only rule and must be fol-
lowed by the states.
Thus subsection four of Cal. Pen. Code § 1524 which allows the
seizure of "mere evidence" would appear to be prima facie unconsti-
tutional if so construed.
III. BOOKMAKING PROSECUTIONS
A. Under Federal Authority
Theoretically, so far as the Federal Government is concerned,
bookmaking is a de facto business upon which a tax is imposed
under the Federal Wagering Tax Law."3 Federal prosecutions follow
from the violation of this act and not from the act of bookmaking.
The leading case applying the Boyd principles to the bookmaking
situation is United States v. Clancy.44 There, pursuant to a warrant,
federal agents seized the betting papers of the defendant. The prose-
cution was for violation for the Federal Wagering Tax Law. The
Court held" that gambling paraphernalia, such as that used in the
commission of a crime in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, becomes a
-8 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 643.
99 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 1.
40 367 U.S. at 643.
41 378 U.S. 1.
42 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 135-37 (1932).
43 26 U.S.C. § 4411 (1954) states: 'There shall be imposed a special tax of $50
per year to be paid by each person who is liable for tax under section 4401 or
who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person so liable."
44 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960). The other leading federal case on the bookmaking
facts is Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959) wherein it was
held, without analysis of the problem, that bookmaking paraphernalia was the
instrumentality of committing the crime.
45 276 F.2d at 630.
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part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense
and thus constitutionally seizable. The court also pointed out that
its view could be sustained under the "required records exception"
to the rule prohibiting the seizure of "mere evidence," in that the
federal law required gamblers to keep records and books of their
dealings so federal agents can inspect them.46
Clancy, in holding that the seizure of the bookmaking parapher-
nalia, could be justified under the "required records" exception was
dearly correct. Federal law requires that bookmakers keep records
of their transactions." This has long been an established exception
and one which was mentioned in the Boyd case."8 But where Clancy
alternatively holds that the seizure of the bookmaking papers could
be justified because they were in effect the means of committing the
crime, it would appear to have incorrectly applied the principles
laid down in the Boyd-Gouled-Lefkowitz line of cases. For that
matter, Clancy would appear to be indistinguishable from Lefkowitz.
Although there was no warrant in Lefkowitz, to hold that this would
distinguish the case would be to adopt the proposition that a broader
search can be made incident to a lawful arrest than can be made
pursuant to a search warrant particularly describing the property
seized. As mentioned earlier, this is untrue, the search warrant being
the preferred and broadest method of legal search and seizure. Lef-
kowitz might also be distinguished by the fact that the court said
the search in question was exploratory. But this would be treading
on dangerous ground for this was plainly not the main import of
the decision.
It was held in Lefkowitz that papers which recorded the transac-
tions and listed the customers in illicit liquor traffic sales could not
be seized. This was held to be a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. Similarly, a bookmaker keeping track of his custom-
ers and registering his bets is so analogous as would appear to make
Lefkowitz controlling on the question. This discussion would be
46 Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1, (5th Cir. 1933); cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762
(1933) is a curious case. It involved the search and seizure of papers used in
the sale of illegal liquor, the search being made pursuant to a warrant. The court
held the seizure of the papers valid, reasoning that the papers were the means of
committing the crime. Lefkowitz was distinguished as involving a forcible explora-
tory search dependent on an arrest. The case ignored the dictum in Lelkowitz
which stated that the officers could not have done what was done with a validly
issued search warrant.
Another example of this "instrumentality of the crime" exception is Landau v.
United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936) a case involving the seizure of an
invoice of smuggled goods by custom agents when the smuggler was not under
arrest. The court reasoned that if a paper could ever be the instrumentality of
committing a crime the circumstances warranted such a holding here.
47 26 U.S.C. §§ 4403, 4423, 6001 (1954).
48 116 U.S. at 623.
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purely academic if it were not for the fact that the rule now applies
uniformly to the states and the states must now use Clancy as a
guideline in construing the rule to apply to the various bookmaking
statutes.
B. Under California Law
The analysis of Clancy, in the preceding section, is of no import
in California. Under federal law possession of bookmaking papers
is not a crime, under California law it is. Under Cal. Pen. Code §
337 a (2) it is a crime to occupy a room with betting parapherna-
lia for the purpose of registering bets. This statute effectively makes
the possession of betting paraphernalia a crime within this context.
It would appear that this would fall within the exception to the
general rule that papers may be seized when competent legislative
authority has declared that they are illegal to possess.5" This conclu-
sion would seem to stand over any contention that the scratch sheets
and memoranda used are essentially private papers for they are
shown to no one. Private or not, where valid legislative authority,
under the police power of the state, declares possession of certain
papers a crime such papers are seizable.
Under Cal. Pen. Code § 337 a (4)51 it is a crime to register a
bet. All the papers and paraphernalia used by bookmakers to reg-
ister bets would appear to be properly seizable pursuant to a search
warrant under the exception to the general rule that private papers
are seizable if they are the means of committing the crime.52 This
40 CAL. PEN. CODE § 337a (2): "Every person .. .Who .. .keeps, or occupies,
... any room ...with a book or books, paper or papers, apparatus, device or
paraphernalia, for purpose of recording or registeing any bet or bets ... wager or
wagers . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or state prison for a
period of not less than thirty days and not exceeding one year."
50 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 624.
n' CAL. PaN. CODE § 337a (4): "Every person . who ... registers any bet or
bets ... is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or state prisons for a
period of not less than thirty days and not exceeding one year."
G2 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. at 238. Diligent research has produced, as of
1965, one lone California case discussing the problem. In People v. Barthel, 231
Adv. Cal. App. 903, 42 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1965), a case involving the seizure of
bookmaking paraphernalia, the fourth district court of appeals stated: "Finally
the defendant argues that the objects taken were not subject to seizure and thus
violated the defendant's right of privacy and privilege against self-incriminationunder the Fourteenth Amendment of the U ited Stat s Consti ution... are cited
for the proposition that records, letters, papers and other evidence, which is of an
innocuous and utilitarian nature, cannot be the object of seizure under a search
warrant.""The rule stated in Goyded is that objects of only evidentiary value may not
be seized, and when they are they may be suppressed." The court went on to cite
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947), stating the rule that the instru-
mentalities of a crime may be validly seized.
"Applying this test here involves a determination of whether the objects seized
were utilized in perpetrating the crimes for which the defendant was arrested and
convicted. We conclude they could have been so used (United States v. Clancy, 276
F.2d 617; United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539) and therefore they were
properly subject to seizure under constitutional standards (citations omitted)
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conclusion would seem to prevail over any contention that the bets
could be registered by memory and therefore the paper registration
is not necessarily a means of committing the offense. It would ap-
pear under a statute such as this that the legislative intent was to
make illegal the paper registration.
IV. CONCLUSION.
Although the recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of search
and seizure have made the states conform to the overriding federal
standard, requiring the state courts to reject evidence illegally seized,
it would appear that the recent case of Malloy v. Hogan, applying
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the
states, would have no effect on the bookmaking laws of California. 3
Malloy would not disrupt the enforcement of the bookmaking stat-
utes, because the seizure of bookmaking papers pursuant to a search
warrant can be upheld pursuant to the common law exception to the
general rule that papers are properly seizable if they are either
illegal to possess or the means of committing the crime.
Malloy when read in conjunction with Mapp v. Ohio leaves no
doubt that subsection (4) of Cal. Pen. Code § 1524 is unconstitu-
tional on its face for it allows the seizure of "mere evidence" pur-
suant to a search warrant. The federal rule growing out of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments condemns such a procedure. Since the
relevant portions of both amendments are now held to apply to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Cal. Pen. Code § 1524
(4) falls victim to the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Consti-
tution.
G. Dennis Adams
53 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1323: "A defendant in a criminal action or proceeding cannot
be compelled to be a witness against himself; but if he offers himself as a witness,
he may be cross-examined by the counsel for the people as to all matters about
which he was examined in chief. The failure of the defendant to explain or to
deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be com-
mented upon by counsel." .Maloy would make this statute unconstitutional for no
inference can be drawn from the refusal of a defendant to testify in the federal
courts. 1 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 116 (1963).
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